A win-win situation with Europe. Will China win twice or will internal divisions allow inaction to prevail?

We know that the ideological rigor and certainties regarding identity have evaporated with globalization.  This phenomenon forces us into a perennial negotiation, where power must combine with the capacity to manage it.  The latter is deficient for both Europe and China.  Brussels is torn apart by internal divisions that reduce its impact and effectiveness; traditionally, Beijing is accustomed to negotiating with the sole lever of power, whether demonstrated, suffered, or put into action.  Chinese President Xi Jin Ping’s recent mission in Europe has clearly brought this impasse to light.  Trade agreements—especially with Germany and France—were copious and large-scale.  It could not have happened any other way: Beijing needs quality, and in exchange, Europe wants currency, profits, and jobs.  In any case, Beijing has much greater ambitions: a neutral political relationship centered on business, if not downright friendly.  On the chessboard of globalization, Europe can in some way compensate for China’s ambivalent relationship with the United States.  Relations between Beijing and Washington are in a phase where tensions are winning over agreements; China is more like a strategic competitor rather than a strategic partner.  The relationship between China and Europe is developed, open, and prospers, but excellent proof demonstrating the capabilities of China’s new diplomacy is lacking.  There were three cornerstones of a possible understanding: removing military embargoes, willingness to provide technology, or recognizing their economy as a free market.  These objectives now seem insufficient and could fall apart in the context of a larger commercial and political agreement, a veritable Free Trade Agreement.  China would reap great advantages: complete access to rich markets, the availability of new productive capacities, and the possibility to acquire important assets in economies stricken by crisis.  Furthermore, and maybe the most important reason, it would find an additional and perhaps competing partner to the United States.  Therefore, all the premises to insist on an agreement from China’s perspective exist.  In any case, at the other end of Eurasia, the interlocutor is unstable, divided, imposing, and maybe nonexistent.  Kissinger asked whom he needed to call to speak with Europe; Beijing wonders who could answer.  In doubt, Berlin and Brussels stand out; at least deals are closed in Germany.  In the meantime, the European Commission demonstrates its inconsistencies.  All of its threats to China have gone unfulfilled, a Europe based on rights is sacrificed to a Europe based on goods, and semantics is discussed before values, typical behavior for bureaucrats.  Barroso and Van Rompuy were very clear after their meetings with Xi: “Europe is in agreement with proceeding toward a free trade agreement in the medium term.  We prefer to work toward an investment agreement (bilateral investment treaty) initially.”  Contemporaneously, the Eurozone crisis is hot on their heels, unemployment is dramatic, and there is a very strong feeling that political intervention is necessary.  Anti-Euro feelings, bitterness toward Brussels, regret over the loss of national currencies, and ostracizing China are escalating dangerously.  These positions are retrograde, but Brussels is doing nothing to avoid them.  It should manage a complex situation; instead, it’s imprisoned by its own weaknesses: vetoes, lack of a long-term vision, and the absence of adequate leaders.  Crafting an agreement with China demands involvement, competence, and sharing the same objectives.  It involves dialoguing without selling Europe’s heritage and materials Europe has accumulated over decades of prosperity and democracy.  Instead, everything is left to Beijing’s weight with respect to the frequently selfish interests of single states.  If bilateralism hobbles along with the European Commission, bilateralism with capitals of the Old Continent will prevail.  The European Commission has no choice but to bend and perpetuate the agony of public statements.  They abandon ineffective and unfruitful expressions: collaboration, dialogue, and win-win situation.  It’s a game that China will win twice if it’s not negotiated with acumen, even if it’s more than likely that internal divisions between European countries will create an invisible wall.